Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971

Alan D. Frandsen v. Gene Gerstner and Zelda Gerstner : Brief of
Respondents

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2

Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Alan H. Bishop, James P. Cowley, and Robert D. Maack;
Attorneys for Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Frandsen v. Gerstner, No. 12134 (1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/5036

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ALAND. FRANDSEN,

PWi,ntiff-Respondent,

vs.

GENE GERSTNER and ZELDA
GERSTNER, his wife,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plai,ntiflsA.ppeUants,

Case No.
1213'

vs.

MT. OLYMPUS REALTY, INC.,

a Utah corporation,

Third-Party DefendantReapondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
On Appeal from the District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah
Hon. Marcellus K. Snow

ILE D
Ill A.I

Cf,,::

I

'J">rem•

9ANN<>'l'HN,

•·

,'.

0 1971
-·---- ........

Court, Ute&

,,..

GREENE & NEBEKER

OMAS GREENE

'Uld GIFFORD W. PRICE
'8o :Kennecott Building
, Wt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellants

ALAN H. BISHOP
·
353 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent
Alan Frandsen
PUGSLEY, HAYES, WATlaSS
CAMPBELL & COWLEY
JAMES P. COWLEY and
ROBERT D. MAACK
400 El Paso Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

XAT URE OF THE CASE ....................................

I

DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER
COURT ................................................................

2

NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON
APPEAL .............................................................. 3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ...................... 3
..:\..RGUlVIENT ............................................................ 6
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT
ERR IN DIRECTING VE RD I C T FOR
PLAINTIFFS. ON MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT THE INQUIRY MUST
BE DIRECTED TO\V ARD
WHETHER
REASONABLE MINDS COULD DISAGREE
ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED SO AS
TO PROVIDE A QUESTION FOR THE
JURY. ..........................................................................

POINT II. AN OFFER TO PURCHASE
THE PREMISES KNOWN AS THE MILLCREEK INN WAS FORMALLY ACCEPTED ON JUNE 3, 1969, BY A TELEGRAM
SENT BY DEFENDANT, GERSTNER, TO
HIS AGENT MT. OLYMPUS REALTY,
IXC .. YVHO IN TURN COMMUNICATED
THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER TO
1

6

Pagt
THE PLAINTIFF FRANDSEN BY TELE.

PHONE .

································································
!

A. IT IS THE MOST ELEl\IENTARY
PRINCIPLE OF CONTRACT LAW
THAT THE ELEMENTS OF A BILATERAL CONTRACT CONSIST OF
AN OFFER AND AN ACCEPTANCE.

B. THE ONLY REAL ISSUE IN DISPUTE IS WHEN THE DEFENDANT
TELEPHONED HIS AGENT JOHN T.
HYDE AT MT. OLYMPUS REALTY
TO ATTEMPT A MODIFICATION OF
THE CONTRACT. -----------------·-····················
111

POINT III. AN AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO AV ALID CONTRACT, BUT THE
LA"\V IMPUTES TO A PERSON AN INTENTION CORRESPONDING TO THE
REASON ABLE MEANING OF HIS "\i\TORDS
AND ACTS. -·-···-···-······---·································
1: '.
A. THE TELEGRAM OF ACCEPTANCE
DI SP AT CHE D BY APPELLANT
STATED AN UNCONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF EACH AND EVERY
TERM OF THE OFFER MADE TO
HIM BY RESPONDENT. ·--········----------·-·.U

B. THE TERMS GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO JOHN HYDE OVER
THETELEPHONEONJUNEaWEll
ATTEMPTS TO MODIFY A CONTRACT PREVIOUSLY FORMED AND
ARE THUS IMMATERIAL TO ANY
ISSUE IN DISPUTE ON THIS AP1:1
PEAL.························-···········-················
11

Page

c. THERE 'VAS ABSOLUTE AGREE-

MENT ON ALL THE TERMS OF THE
OFFER :MADE BY FRANDSEN TO
GERSTENER AND THE TELEGRAM
OF ACCEPTANCE 'VAS A COMPLETE
ACCEPTANCE AND NOT MERELY A
PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ......... 16

D. THERE IS NO MERIT TO THE APPELLANT'S CONTENTION THAT
THE CLOSING DOCUMENTS HAD
TO llE EXECUTED AS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO BEING BOUND IN
CONTRACT ..................................................... 19

POINT IV. IT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE
TO THE VALIDITY OF THE JUNE 3, 1969,
CONTRACT THAT THE EARNEST
)CONEY RECEIPT BE SIGNED AT THAT
Tl.;\IE. -------·--·--·----··············--····-············-·····-················
20
POINT V. THE CONTRACT OF JUNE 3,
SATISFIES ALL OF THE REQUIRE51ENTS OF UTAH'S ST AT UTE OF
FRAUDS. ----------------···--------·····--····-·············--··············
21
19fi9,

POINT VI. MT.OLYMPUS REALTY ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF ITS AUTHORITY IN BINDING THE
DEFENDANT AND THE PLAINTIFF TO
THE AGREEMENT AND AT ALL TIMES
ACTED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT
WITH THE HIGHEST TRADITIONS OF
FlDlTCIARY TRUST.-----·--··---------···--·--·-------·--------24
A. MT. OLYMPUS DID NOT EXCEED
ITS AUTHORITY BY BINDING THE
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT TO
111

Page

AN AGREEMENT TO SELL THE
MILLCREEK INN PROPERTY ............. 2j
B. MT. OLYMPUS REALTY AT ALL
TIMES FOLLOWED A COURSE OF
CONDUCT CONSISTENT 'VITH THE
HIGHEST FIDELITY OF FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION. ·----·-----·-------·-·-·············
21;
POINT VII. MT.
REALTY
HAD EXPRESS WRITTEN AUTHORITY
TO ACT FOR DEFENDANT AND BIND
THE PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT IN
CONTRACT. --------------·······-··············-·--···············
27
A. MT. OLYMPUS REALTY, PURSUANT TO THE "SALES AGENCY CONTRACT", WAS GIVEN EXPRESS
WRITTEN AUTHORITY TO ACT AS
EXCLUSIVE AGENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS GERSTNER ......................... 28
B. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND, AND
THERE IS ABUNDANT EVIDENCE
TO SHOW, THAT A CONTRACT WAS
MADE BETWEEN ALAN FRANDSEN
AND THE GERSTNERS ON JUNE 3,

1969. ··-········-··-·······-················-··············-···
28

POINT VIII. MT. OLYMPUS REALTY IS
ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT
AWARDING A REALTOR'S COMMISSION. 29

CONCLUSION··············-·················-···············
.31
CASES CITED
Beta Sigma Tau v. Shrine Civic Auditorium, J.59
Cal. App. 2d 281, 323 P.2d 496 (19 ) .... 20, 2l
lV

Page
Birdsell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah 412,
242 P.2<l 578 (1952) -···---·---······---····---·-····--·
22, 24
Boskovich v. Utah Construction Co., 123 Utah 387,
239 P.2d 885 (1953) .. ________ ,,_ ........................... 6, 7
Cox"· Berry, 19 Utah 2d 352, 431P.2d575 (1967) ·- 21
Curtis v. l\lortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 P.2d 237

( 1954) ,.,, __________ ,,_ .... _,_,, ___ ,,_ .. ,_ .............. , _____ .. ,, ______ .. 30

Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co.,
127 Mo. 388, 105 S.W. 777 (1907) --------------·--·-- 15
Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. Eimco, 115 Utah 590,
207 P.2d 794 ( 1949) -........ --.... -.................... _. 18, 22
Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566

(1949) ,.,,_ .. ___ ,, ............................................ 7, 8, 12

Koepke Sayles & Co. v. Lustig et ux., 283 P. 458

( 1929) __ ,, __ .............................................................. 10

Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493, 84 S.E. 2d 516

( 1954) _,,,, ____ ,, ______ .,,_,, __ ,, ........................ -...... _......... 13

Printing Trustees v. Krueger, 437 P.2d 856
('Vyo. 1968) __ ,, ...................................................... 23

R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194,

247 P.2d 817 (1952) .............. -....................... 14, 18

Schlageter Estate Co. v. Koontz, 97 Cal. App. 2d
814, 218 P.2d 814 (1950) .................................... 21
Smissaert v. Chiodo, 163 Cal. App. 2d 827, 330
p .2d 98 ( 1958) .......... ,___ ,,, ............................... 20, 21

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Annotated (1953) .......... -......... -- 22
Bulk Sales Act .......... _,_ .... _.......... -... ---- .. -- ................ _.. _ 18
v

AUTHORITIES CITED
17 Am. J ur. 2d Contracts §§43-45 ........................ 8,

17 Am. J ur. 2d Contracts §465 .................................... 2:1

49 Am. J ur. 2d Statute of Frauds §321 .................. 2.1
49 Am. J ur. 2d Statute of Frauds §326 .................... 2.1
Restatement of the Law, Contracts §26 .................... rn
Restatement of the Law, Contracts, §207 .................. 22
Williston on Contracts, Revised Ed. §72 ............ H, 211
Williston on Contracts, Revised Ed., §78 .............. 17, li

Vt

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
:\LAN D. FRANDSEN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
CENE GERSTNER and ZELDA
(;ERSTNER, his wife,
Defendants and
Third-Party PlaintiffsAppellants.

Case No.
12134

vs.

=wr. OLY.MPUS REALTY, INC.,

a Ctah corporation,

Third-Party DefendantRespondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action ·was brought by the plaintiff against
rhe dtfendants, G-ene and Zelda Gerstner, asking for
1

the conveyance of property known as the Millcreek l .
to the plaintiff, and the defendants counterclaun·ed I!: .
also brought in Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc., as
party defendant, asserting the liability of Mt. Olymp::
Realty, Inc. to the defendants for any recovery Lnn,
plaintiff together with damages and defendants
the claim by Mt. Olympus for a real estate comrnissior

DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LO\VER COl:RT
The case below was tried to a jury in the Thirc
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Hon
Marcellus K. Snow presiding. The lower court directer:
a verdict against appellants awarding plaintiff, AlaL 1
Frandsen, specific performance of an agreement whid
the Court found to have been entered into between tht,
parties on June 3, 1969. The lower court also directe:. I
a verdict in favor of third-party defendant Mt. Olympu·
Realty, Inc., for the sum of $1,230.00 representini
a real estate commission. In addition, $1,000.00 attor·
neys' fees and costs of court were awarded to
·
and third-party defendant.
1

Appellants filed timely motions to dismiss botn
the complaint and the third-party defendant counter
claim. As a matter of law, all parties filed motions for
directed verdicts. A motion for new trial and to alte:
and amend judgment after extensive argument w3•
denied by the lower court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
l{espondents seek to have the Supreme Court
att'irm the findings and j udgrnent of the District Court
ol Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

STATEl\tIENT OF FACTS
The trial of the case on appeal lasted four days;
the trial record is 364 pages long. The testimony of the
plaintiff (Frandsen) is 55 pages long; the testimony
uf the real estate agent (John Hyde) is 64 pages long;
the testimony of the defendant-appellant (Gerstner) is
over 100 pages long. With the exception of two lines
1R.3ul,400), all of the evidence shows that the material
facts are these:
The defendant, a California resident, was the owner
of property known as the Millcreek Inn which he desired
to sell (R.352; Ex. P-36). Since he resided in California
he arranged to have his mother, a Utah resident, list
the property with Mt. Olympus Realty, Inc., a Salt
Lake realtor (R.399;Ex. P-1). On May 9, 1969,
Gerstner's mother went to the offices of Mt. Olympus
Realty and there executed on behalf of her son a standaru form listing agreement known as a "Sales Agency
Contract" (R.399; Ex.P-1). On June 2, 1969, John
Hyue, an agent for Mt. Olympus Realty, had secured
a prospective purchaser (Alan Frandsen) who filled out
and signed a formal "Off er to Purchase and Earnest
.Honey Receipt" and deposited with Olympus his check
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for $500.00 earnest money (Ex. P-6). On the sanh
day, June 2, 1969, John Hyde and Ken Prothero (boti
agents of Mt. Olympus Realty) placed a call to tiir
defendant Gerstner at his place of work in Californi.
(R.150, 356). During the three-way conversation Joh
Hyde informed Gerstner of the Frandsen offer anii
repeated the terms several times in order for Gerstner
to make notes (R.358). Gerstner told Hyde that nt
wanted to discuss the offer with his wife but would Je1
him know if he accepted the off er within 24 hours anc
agreed to send a telegram if he accepted (R.357-358
Later, on the evening of the same day (June 2, 1969
Gerstner sent a telegram to John Hyde of Olympu,
Realty accepting the terms of the Frandsen offer rerbatim ( R.360,358) . The telegram read:
Offer made on June 2d, 1969 by Alan D. Frarnl·
sen for Millcreek Inn is accepted -Tem
$3,000.00 down $2,000.00 within 30 days ai·
sumption of L. D. Hudson mortgage and tir
mortgage to Gene Gerstner for $7,000.00 01
buyers rental property. (Ex. P-7).
1

On the following morning (June 3, 1969) upon arririn;
at his office at Mt. Olympus Realty, John Hyde re
ceived the telephone message from Western Union tha:
the Gerstners had sent the telegram accepting all
of the Frandsen offer that were read to Gerstner
the telephone conversation on the previous day (R
146). Upon receiving this news of Gerstner's accept
ance, Hyde telephoned Frandsen to inform him
his offer had been accepted and he had "purchased 111 111
self a restaurant" (R.198,275).
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Later on the same day (June 3, 1969) defendant
(,crstner telephoned John Hyde at his Mt. Olympus
iitficc ancl informed Hyde that after thinking it over
lie had changed his mind and wanted "first position" on
the
property rather than a security interest
in Frandsen' s rental property ( R.361) and asked if
Hy<le would call Frandsen to see if he would modify
the security portion of the contract ( R.172) . Hyde
then telephoned Frandsen and informed him of Gerstner's request; Frandsen, in response to the request,
stated he believed "something could be worked out,"
(RJ99,301), whereupon Hyde informed Gerstner that
Frandsen had consented to the modification that he
(Gerstner) had requested. On June 4, when Mt.
Olympus physically received the telegram, because all
puties seemed to be in agreement, Ken Prothero of
Olympus then signed the Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to purchase in his capacity as Gerstner's agent
to formalize the acceptance. Subsequently, Frandsen
and the agents at Mt. Olympus executed a collateral
assignment in order to comply with Gerstner's request
to be in "first position" on the Millcreek Inn property
iR199; D-12).
Later the same month, on June 16, 1969, when the
arrived in Salt Lake City, they refused to
complete the transaction (R.369-372) objecting to
rarious minor provisions and demanding that Frandsen
pay off a $7,500.00 mortgage to L. D. Hudson (the
preyious owner) and give he, Gerstner, the benefit of
a
discount (R.371-375). Negotiations between
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the parties continued until the latter part of Au
when Frandsen contacted Gerstner and told him
had recently sold a piece of property and was now .
a position to off er Gerstner the purchase price in ca
so there would be no problems of security
297). To this Gerstner indicated thta he did not knr!"
whether he still wanted to sell or not (R.297). At tL
time the plaintiff abandoned and further attempts:
accommodate the desires of the defendant and cur;
menced this action for specific performance of the .Tu:.
3, 1969, contract.
'Vith the exception of two short statements ma11,
by the defendant in his own behalf (Record. pp.3ol
400), these facts are undisputed.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DI
RECTING VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFFS. 0\
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT THI
INQUIRY l\fUST BE DIRECTED TOWARf
'VHETHER REASONABLE :MINDS coru
DISAGREE ON THE EVIDENCE PRESEXT
ED SO AS TO PROVIDE A QUESTION FOR
THE JURY.

Appellant in his brief cites the case of Boskorki
v. Utah Construction Co., 123 Utah 387. 259 P.2d
( 1953), to support the proposition that in consideri11 •
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motion for directed verdict the "evidence must be
conslrnecl in a light most favoravble to the party against
horn the motion is directed and all controverted facts
11
rc,olred in his favor." The appellant quotes out of context to support the proposition, as the next line from
that case reads:

:i

The inquiry, then, must be directed toward
whether reasonable minds could disagree, in this
case on the evidence present so as to provide
a question for the jury.
Furthermore, the Boskovich cites as authority for this
point Jackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P.2d 566
I
where the Utah Supreme Court stated in aftinning a directed verdict:
The court may not permit the jury to speculate
concerning defendants liability . . . and the
court is required to direct a verdict unless there
is eddence from which the jury could reasonably
find in favor of the [defendant].
From a total reading of the Utah cases considering
the question of directed verdicts it is abundantly clear
that the doctrine of viewing the evidence in the light
nMt favorable to defendants is qualified by a reason11blcness standard and that it is not alone sufficient that
all essential evidence is controverted, but all essential
eridence must be controverted to such an extent that
reasonable minds could disagree so as to provide a
r1uestion for the jury. Boskovich v. Utah Construction
Co., supra.
The trial court correctly found that although some
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of plaintiff's evidence was controverted, not all tt,
essentjal evidence was controverted and the facts tha•.
were controverted did not meet the "reasonable ntinJ.
standard" which is required to submit the question c:
liability to the jury. The trial court properly refuser
to allow the jury to speculate as to liability and com.
plied with the Utah Supreme Court's requirement
the verdict be directed unless there is some evidenu
upon which the jury could reasonably find for defendant (R.463). Jackson v. Colston, supra.
POINT II
AN OFFER TO PURCHASE THE
KNOWN AS MILLCREEK INN WAS FOR
MALLY ACCEPTED ON JUNE 3, 1969, BY .1
TELEGRAM SENT BY DEFENDANT, GEH·
STNER, TO HIS AGENT MT. OLYMPn
REALTY, INC., WHO IN TURN COMl\Il'.NI·
CATED THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE OFFER
TO THE PLAINTIF.F FRANDSEN BY TELEPHONE.
A. It is the most elementary principle of contrac!
law that the elements of a bilateral contract consist nl
an offer and an acceptance. (See Am. J ur. 2d Contracl
§§43-45.)
It is undisputed that the plaintiff, Frnndsen, made
a formal offer to defendant Gerstner by way of a writte:i
"Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" (E'
. .
OP
P-6). It is also undisputed that plamtiff
put up $"00
J ·
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in

earnest money as consideration for the off er to pur(H.142-143).
It is undisputed and undenied that plaintiff made

l:is offer to and through the agency of Mt. Olympus

Healty, Inc., which was the authorized agent for the
defendant Gerstner (R.142-143, 308-309), and that
the offer made by Frandsen to John Hyde of Olympus
i\'as communicated by John Hyde of Olympus to the
Jefendant Gerstner by telephone on June 2, 1969 (R.
;Jjli-358).

Defendant does not deny he knew and understood
the terms of the off er and admits it was repeated to him
1ereral times and that he took notes as to the terms
llf the offer (R.358). Defendant Gerstner admits that
after having time to analyze and consider the offer, he
\ent a telegram on June 2, 1969, to his agent John
Hyde of Olympus Realty. The telegram accepted the
exact terms of the Frandsen offer verbatim (R.358:JliO; Ex. P-7).
On the morning of June 3, 1969, upon receiving a
message from 'Vestern Union that the offer had been
mepted and that a telegram specifically setting forth
;1n(l accepting each and every term of the original offer
had been sent by defendant Gerstner, John T. Hyde,
as·ent for Mt. Olympus Realty, telephoned the plaintiff. Alan Frandsen, and communicated to him that his
offer to purchase had been accepted (R.198,275,360),
thus completing all of the requisite elements to form a
rali<l contract.
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Later on the day of June 3, 1969, defendant call ·
John T. Hyde of Olympus to attempt a modificab::,
of the terms of the contract (R.198,360-361,427; n.21
It should be noted that the acceptance was made bv 11 ·
means specified (telegram) to and through John
of Olympus, the same ohannel or agency by which ·I/Ii
offer was made to him.
There are various modes of acceptance whiri,
are equally conclusive upon the parties. Anr·
thing that amounts to a manifestation of a forn{aJ
determination to accept, communicated or pul
in the proper way to be communicated to tht
party making the offer, would doubtless com.
plete the contract. . . . It is a well settled gen.
eral principle that where an offer is made throu,g/1
a particular channel or agency the offeror im·
pliedly authorizes its acceptance through tn1
same channel or agency. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Con·
tracts §45 [Emphasis added.]
The appellant in his brief cites the 'V'ashingto11
case of Koepkei Sayles & Co. v. Lustig et ux., 283 Pac
458 ( 1929), to support the proposition that an accepl·
ance to an offer does not constitute a completed con·
tract until the acceptance is communicated to the
offeror. It is recognized that the l(oepke case presenb
an interesting point of law and its lengthy discussion ir
the brief is a fine piece of scholarship, but it is inappositP
to any issue on this appeal since the acceptance of the
off er was communicated to the plaintiff by telephone
on the morning of June 3, 1969 (R.198,275).
B. The only real issue in dispute is when the dP·
fondant telephoned his agent John T. Hyde at
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Olyinpus Realty, Inc., to attempt a modification of the

eon tract.
Although the defendant testified that he called
carh' in the morning, approximately 7 :30 a.m. (Calitime) (R.360-371, 427), there is no evidence
to support this allegation. John T. Hyde testified that
the off er was communicated to plamtiff before he ret:eired def endanf s telephone call and that he did not
eren arrive at his office until after II :00 a.m. on the
morning of June 3, 1969. Consequently he would not
hare been present at his office in order to receive a telephone call at that hour (R. 198, 168-169) ; plaintiff, Alan
Frandsen, testified that at the time the offer was communicated to him no mention was made of any condition
or modification of the original terms of his offer (R.
But Hyde did call him at a later time to inform
him of Gerstner's change of mind (R.172,199).
The telephone bill of the defendant Gerstner failed
to support his alleged early morning call; on the contrary. although the telephone bill showed no time
fur the call made to Olympus on June 3, it did list
his call to Olympus after a telephone call made to a
Holladay, Utah, number which did show a time of 2 :52
p.m. (Ex. D-21). Although there do exist some exceptions (usually of only a few minutes) , most long distance
telephone calls are listed upon the telephone bill in
chronological order ( R.427-428; Ex. D-21) . Therefore,
if anything, the telephone bill of appellant Gerstner
ltnds to refute rather than support his position.
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In al,l, the trial record is 364 pages in length; jlr
s testimony is 55 pages long; Mr. Hyde's
timony is 64 pages long; and Mr. Gerstner's testimoni
is 100 pages long. In all of this voluminous verbiag;
only two lines, one short ( R.400) , the other garbled
and ambiguous ( R.361), serve to controvert any ma·
terial facts. All the other evidence gives strong coun.
tenance to plaintiff's position. It is obvious that onh
two ambiguous statements made by the defendant j;1
his own behalf, unsupported or corroborated bv am
other evidence whatever, is not sufficient
fo.r
"reasonable minds to disagree." The trial court correct!)
found the existence of a valid contract (R.463) ana
found further that there was insufficient evidence upoi
which reasonable minds could disagree so as to providr
a question for the jury. Jackson v. Colston, supra.

POINT III
AN AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO
VALID CONTRACT, BUT THE LAW DlPUTES TO A PERSON AN INTENTION CORRESPONDING TO THE REASONABLE
MEANING OF HIS WORDS AND ACTS.
A. The telegram of acceptance dispatched bi
appellant stated an unconditional acceptance of eacn
and every term of the offer made to him by respondent
Appellant in his brief (P.22) proffers the state·
ment that "before a contract can be formed there Jllli):
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att unconditional agreement to all material provi,inus of the offer." Respondent is in total agreement with
the above proposition and points out that the telegram
i:t' acceptance dispatched by appellant stated an unconikional acceptance of each and every term of the offer
made to him by respondent (R.358; Ex. P-7) and that
110 additional conditions, exceptions or modifications
11 ere mentioned in the telegram of acceptance (Ex.
P·i). Appellant continuously urges that by sending the
telegram he did not intend to enter into a binding contract. For example: "I sent the telegram based on the
belief that I could continue, or that I could secure Mr.
Frandsen as a buyer ... " ( R.360) and also " ... so he
\ent the telegram as requesetd by Mr. Hyde based on
the belief that he could continue to discuss and revise
the matter" (Appellant's brief P-6).
lie

Whether or not it was the covert, subjective intent
d appellant not to enter into a binding agreement is
nut the issue on this appeal. It is hornbook law that
.-\meriean courts follow the "objective" and not the
·s11bjective" theory of contract formation. Perhaps the
best statement of the American rule is set forth in the
dassical contract case of Lucy v. Zehmer, 196 Va. 493,
8! S..E.2d 516, where the court was faced with a specific
performance action to convey real property to which
ilie defendant contended that he never really intended
'.o enter into a binding agreement, ergo, no meeting of
the lllinds. The court as to this defense held:

. .\11 agreement is essential to a valid contract,
but the law imputes to a person an intention
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corresponding to the reasonable meaning of h1
words and acts. If his words
acts, ju<lge,;
by a reasonable standard, marnfest an intent t11
it is immaterial what the unexpresed sta1
of his mind may be.
t
In the Frandsen v. Gerstner case at hand, no mattti
what the appellant's real intentions were, his overt word
and acts were more than sufficient to impute to him
the reasonable intention to enter into the contract :1,
was so carefully specified in his telegram of acceptance
It would be patently unreasonable under these circumstances to expect either his agent, John Hyde, )!t
Olympus Realty, or the purchaser, Alan Frandsen, t,,
believe appellant intended otherwise.
The law of contracts on this point was incisirely
enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in R. J. Daum
Construction Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d s1;
(1952), where the court stated:

If an offeree unconditionally accepts an offt
before it is withdrawn, a binding contract re·
sults ...
To create a binding contract, the acceptanct
must unconditionally agree to all the material
provisions of the offer and must not add any
new material conditions, but all the provisions 111
the offer need not be expresslv stated therein '.1·'
some may be implied from the surrounding ctr·
cumstances. [Emphasis added.}
The Utah court went on to quote Williston on Contracti
Revised Ed. pp.207-209, §72:
... if there has been an unequiYocal acceptanct
the contract is complete and its binding forci
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eannot he affected by subsequent communications
unless they amount to a mutual agreement to recind.
The rationale' for this legal doctrine is that our
Jeuul
ystem has as one of its chief purposes the security
I'
•
and the realization of expectations reasonably induced
br the expressions of agreement when they do not run
c:nmter to other reasonably induced expectations. See
1','mbr,1; v. H argadine-McKittrick Dr,y Good,s Co., 127
'.\Io. 383, 105 s.,v. 777 (1907).
Applying the law to the facts of the present case, it
" dear that Gerstner's telegram to his agent, Hyde,
accepted each and every term of the offer and that there
were no other conditions or qualifications in the acceptance. \Vhen Frandsen received word of Gerstner's
acceptance it came through John Hyde of Olympus
Realty, the same channel or agency by which the offer
1•.as made. "Then Frandsen received notice of the
:icceptance, the contract became complete and binding.
That Gerstner did not intend to be bound when he sent
the telegram is immaterial since he did not instruct his
agent not to communicate the offer and his subjective
intent in sending his acceptance is outweighed by the
1-rasonable reliance of the other parties involved. It is
the letter, spirit and policy of the law of contracts that
dfect be given and the parties bound by the reasonable
ixpeetations they create in the minds of other parties
tri the agreement. That Gerstner later changed his
111 ind and telephoned his agent in an attempt to interl'tpt or retrieYe his telegram of acceptance cannot retro-
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actively alter a contract that has already been coii .
mated.
B. The terms given by the defendant to John Hnlt
over the telephone on June 3, were attempts to modi!
a contract previously formed and are thus immateri:1.
to any issue in dispute on this appeal.
Respondent admits all of the allegations urged
appellant's brief argument Point III ( B) as to thr
desires of the appellant Gerstner to modify the contrarr
and all of the benefits that would accrue to him har.
he been able to persuade Alan Frandsen to so modify
It is not denied by respondents that appellant Gerstner
did telephone John Hyde on June 3, 1969, in order t"
attempt to modify the contract that had already bm
completed (as thoroughly supported and discussed i1
Point II, supra). However, it is pointed out that :r,
view of the fact the trial court found the original co11·
tract was fully formed and completed ( R.463), co11
jecture as to what would have been the effect of:.
modified contract is not relevant or material to tk
appeal.
j1

1

C. There was absolute agreement on all the tern:·
of the offer made by Frandsen to Gerstner and the tele·
gram of acceptance was a complete acceptance and rw
merely a part of the negotiations.
Although appellant Gerstner admits that he sen:
a telegram accepting verbatim the terms of the Franli
sen offer (R.358), he contends that the telegram "w::·
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11

llh a part of the negotiations" (Brief of Appellant,

The contents of the telegram read:
Ofj'cr m.ade on June 2, 1969 bv Alan D. Frandsen for 111illcreek Inn is accepted terms $3000
down $2000 within 30 days assumption of L. D.
Hudson mortgage and first mortgage to Gerstner for $7000 on buyers rental property. (Ex.
P-7) [Emphasis added.}

difficult to conceive of any language of acceptance
more direct and unequivocal.
it

To state that this acceptance is only language of

uegotiation would be to do away with the binding effect
:'l' :i contract as the very terms on which he claims there
was a material alteration of the contract (i.e. security
\Ill the rental property) was one of the terms he specifically accepted in his telegram.

In response to appellant's contention that not all

terms of the contract were present in the telegram (i.e.
the inn'ntory provision) , respondent again cites the
11pinion of R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Child, supra,
1rhere the Utah Supreme Court stated:

To create a binding contract the acceptance
must unconditionally agree to all material prorisions of the offer, and must not add any new
material conditions, but all of the provisions of
m offer need not be expressly stated therein some ma,1; be implied from surro-unding circumstances.
1

·1·1

l'tah Court went on to quote Williston on Contrat'ts, Re,·ised Ed., §78:
if

17

Sometimes an acceptor from abundance of ...
tion inserts a condition in his acceptance
merely expresses what would be implied
?r in law from vhe offer. As such a condif
mvolves no qualification of the acceptor's
to the terms of the offer, a contract is not prt
eluded.
The Utah Supreme Court took the same position
Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. Eimco, 115 Utah 590,
P.2d 794 (1949).

11

.

During the trial Mr. Hultquist testified that n:
informed Gerstner that the "Bulk Sales Act" requirrc
an inventory ( R. 128).
( 1) Applying the foregoing law to the case at hanc
the Utah Supreme Court has made clear that "Not a!

provisions of an offer must be expressly stated in t/1,
acceptance-some may be implied from the surroundin
circumstances." Daum v. Child, supra.
( 2) Some provisions are not necessary to expresil:
enumerate as they will be implied by law or fact. Daur

v. Child, supra; Hawaiian Equipment Co. v. Eimc
supra; and Williston on Contract, Rev. Ed. §78.

( 3) Gerstner knew or should have known thau
inventory was required by the "Bulk Sales Ac( as f·

was informed of this by Mr. Hultquist (R.128) "
Gerstner acknowledged this notice (R.363). Therefo:
this certainly is a case where the inventory requirellle:
1
must be implied by law and must also be implied '·
surrounding circumstances.
11
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That the respondent Alan Frandsen later agreed
11 modify the security arrangement in order to accominodatc the appellant should not be construed in such
\\''1\' as to be used against him as he was merely atin good faith to complete the business transaction without resorting to litigation.

o.

There is no merit to the appellant's contention
that the closing documents had to be executed as a con1Jition precedent to being bound in contract.
It is not disputed that the appellant did not see
the documents until June 16, 1969, because he was

in California and did not want to come to Utah
tu execute the documents until they were all prepared .
.\s Gerstner stated: "I'm not making a 1600 mile round
trip unless I know things are in order." ( R. 369) .
It is a basic tenet of contract law that in order

fur a contract to become binding, it requires only the

tkments of offer and acceptance. The fact that there
:1rc other writings to be executed does not negate the
concept of a Yalid contract. As the Restatement of Contracts §26 puts it:

)lutual manifestations of assent that are in themselves sufficient to make a contract will not be
preYented from so operating by the mere fact
that the parties also manifest an intention to
prepare and adopt a written memorial thereof
On this same point JVilliston on Contracts, supra, states
'11 part:

19

... if there
been an unequiYocal acceptaiitt
the contract is complete and its binding fon·,
be affected by subsequent conununic,.
hons . . . .
The California court expressed the general rule- .

Smissaert v. Chiodo, 163 Cal. App. 2d 827,
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(1958):

"There all the essential terms of an agreerne 11 •
are definitely agreed upon in writing, there
a binding contract even though there is an j11
tention that a formal writing will he exeeutt:
later.
1

•

And also, in Beta Sigma Tau v. Shrine Civic A1111torium, 159 Cal. App. 2d 281, 323 P .2d J.9G (
the court stated:
"There the parties have agreed upon all emu·
tial facts, there is a binding contract notw1tr.
standing that a more formal contract is to !1
prepared and signed later.
It is well settled law then, that executing closing duc:.ments is not a condition precedent to a valid real esta 1:
contract.

POINT IV
I'l' IS NOT A PREREQUISITE TO THE\"\
LID I TY OF THE JUNE 3, 1969, CONTlt-\L:
TIIA'f TIIE EARNEST :MONEY RECElf
UE SIGNED AT THAT Tll.\ilE.
Point IY of argument in appellant's brief is bi.
11
ging the question as it is merely a restatement of

20

·uument set forth in Point III (E). There is no ques111 n that the contract of June 3, 1969, was complete
:iiHl ralid. That the parties agreed to sign an additional
,Jocument at a later time cannot negate the existence
, 1f that contrad. See Smissaert v. Chiodo, supra, and
;1 I I'

Jlct 11 Siynw 1'an v. Shrine Civic Auditorium, supra,

Point Ill. See also SchUigeter Estate Co. v. Koontz,
,; Cal. App. 2d 814, 218 P.2d 814 (1950):

Where parties have agreed upon all essential
facts, there is a binding contract, notwithstanding the fact that a more formal contract is to
be prepared and signed later.
Berry, 19 Utah 2d 352, 431 P.2d 575 ( 1967),
''here the C tah court by way of dicta stated:

(ox t'.

EYen where it appears that it is intended that
others sign an agreement, it is not necessarily
inrnria bly true that all must sign before any are
bound.

Thus. the absence of a contemporaneous signing of the
money receipt cannot affect the validity of the
.J 11ne 3, contract.

POINT V

nrn

CONTRACT OF JUNE 3, 1969, SATISFIES ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF
C'J'.\H'S STATUTE OF FRAUDS .
;

. \ppellant's contention that the contract of June
is inntlid because it fails to meet the require-
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ments of the Utah statute of frauds is rendered a )le:
functory attempt to blur the issues by even a <'ti .
examination of the Utah cases on the point. For ei.
ample: In Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121
412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952), the Utah Supreme Cour
with regard to §25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated
stated:
An acknowledgment or recognition that a cc::
tract has been entered into by the parties neei:
not be shown by memorandum in cases wl1er1
written and signed offer is relied upon as a mcm.
randum, for the acceptance may be proved f,1
oral testimony. [Emphasis added.]
·
The Utah Supreme Court dealt again with tr'
statute of frauds problem in Hawaiian Equipment(
v. Eimco, supra, where the court in ruling on the sutl
ciency of a telegram to satisfy the statute of frauu,
requirement quoted the Restatement of the Law, Coi:
tracts, §207, which sets forth the general requirement
of a memorandum:
A memorandum, in order to make enforceaoi:
a contract within the statute, may be any dor1
ment or writing, formal or informal signed\.
the party to be charged or by his agent. achia1,
or apparently authorized thereunto, which stat:
with reasonable certainty:
(a) Each party to the contract
by t·
own name, or by such description as will str
to identify him . . .
(b) The land, goods or other subject mat'
to which the contract relates; and
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(c) The terms and conditions of all the promises constituting the contract and by whom the
promises are made.
Comment:
a. A written memorandum of a contract is not
identical with a written contract. A written contract will indeed serve as a memorandum, but
a memorandum includes also any writing which
the terms agreed upon, though not intended or adopted by the parties as a final complete
statement of their agreement ....

The Supreme Court of W yarning observed another
:mportant proposition of the statute of frauds in Printinq Trnstees v. Krueger, 437 P.2d 856 (1968):
A memorandum of an oral agreement need not
be entered into contemporaneously with such
an agreement in order to satisfy the statute of
frauds and the memorandum may also consist of

several related writings connected with each
other and connected with the sub}ect matter of
the transaction. [Emphasis added.]

Finally, 49 Am. Jur., Statute of FrauM, §321,
states:
No particular form of language or instrument
is necessary to constitute a memorandum or note
in writing under the statute of frauds, where the
statute does not require that the contract itself
be reduced to a writing. It is the general rule
that a memorandum wholly untechnical in form
may be sufficient. It may consist of any writing,
from a solemn deed down to mere hasty notes.

Telegrams, §326:
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A contract binding between two parties ni
b.e made or proved by telegrams and a telegra'.;'
signed by the party to be charged
if it cunt a111,: ·
.
I
t
f
h
t 1e erm.s .o t e contract or is . c?nnected wit
other
or
contammg as a wh1I
such terms is a sufficient memorandum as r·
gards the statute of frauds.

From a review of the foregoing authority it is clea:
that since appellant was responding to a formal!:
written and signed offer to purchase, even an oral a;
ceptance would have been sufficient to satisfy the statult
See Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., supra. A forti111
a written and signed telegram of acceptance reciting :ii
of the necessary terms (i.e. ( 1) designation of ea1:
party; (2) description of the subject matters; 1:i
terms and conditions of sale) will suffice. It appm
that either the formal "offer to purchase" (Ex. P·b
or the formal telegram of acceptance (Ex. P-7) stani .
ing alone would have been sufficient memoranda l
meet the statutory requirement. Taken together ther
can be no question. The appellant's statute of frau1!
argument is absolutely without any substance whatern

POINT VI
MT. OLYMPUS REALTY ACTED PROPER
LY AND 'VITHIN THE SCOPE OF ITS Al
THORITY IN BINDING THE DEFENDA\i
AND THE PLAINTIFF TO THE AGREE
l\IENT AND AT ALL TIMES ACTED IX:
:MANNER CONSISTENT 'VITH THE HH,11
EST TRADITIONS OF FIDUCIARY THU;
24

A. )lt. Olympus did not exceed its authority by
,,, 11 Jing the plaintiff and defendant to an agreement
i11 sell the )Iillcreek Inn property.
It is the business of realtors to seek out and find

uyers Lo purchase the property for their clients, the
it·liers. It is undisputed that the defendants Gerstners
,riwed
Mt. Olympus Realty to find a purchaser for
111 /:)
1'
their Millcreek Inn property (R.116, 339; Ex. P-1).
The pertinent portion of the agreement between the
krstners and Mt. Olympus Realty reads:
[1

In consideration for your [Mt. Olympus] agreement to list the property ... and to use reasonable efforts to find a purchaser ... [Mt. Olympus] has exclusive right to sell or exchange said
property . . . at a price or terms to which I may
agree in writing. (Ex. P-1) [Emphasis added.]
lt is undisputed that Mt. Olympus was successful in
iinding a purchaser for the Millcreek Inn property on
terms that the defendant Gertsner agreed to in writing
.Ex. P-7). It is also undisputed that defendant Gerstner later felt insecure in his position on the property
md telephoned his agent John Hyde instructing him
:,, a5k the plaintiff Frandsen for a modification of the
iecurity portion of the transaction (R.360-371,427; Ex.
D-21). It is not denied that John Hyde called Frandsen
t" attempt to arrange a modification in the terms of
contract concerning the security (R.199,172,1461

!H,169,170).

It was established at the trial that the plaintiff
Frandsen agreed with Gertsner's request to make a
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modification in the security portion of the transact:
stating that "I think this can be worked out." (R.J 8:,
and that subsequently Frandsen caused to be executt
a collateral assignment in order to accommodate Ger<
ner' s request ( R.299; D-12).
.

As is extensively supported in Points II and Ill
supra, Gerstner had already accepted Frandsen's off:
in his telegram (Ex. P-7), and John Hyde had co
municated the acceptance to Frandsen by telephon:
since Gerstner stated he was apparently still rer.
anxious to "secure Frandsen as a buyer" (R.360) aL.
since Frandsen had agreed to "work something ou
with Gerstner with regard to security in order to acco[
modate Gerstner's wishes (R.199,) the agents of )J:
Olympus believed they had secured a buyer on terrr
acceptable to their client Gerstner and therefore, in,
good faith belief that Gerstner still wanted to secur 1
the Frandsen off er, formally signed the "Earnt
J.\<Ioney Receipt and Off er to Purchase" in order to biL :
Frandsen to the agreement (R.250,238,245, Ex. P·o '
It is unquestionable that the agents of Mt.
Realty acted in a manner consistent with what, frr
all outward appearances, were the express wishe1
their client in employing sound and efficient busint·
practices and reasonable efforts "to find and secure
purchaser for the property which was acceptable. ·
their client.
11

1

B. Mt. Olympus Realty at all times followed
course of conduct consistent with the highest frltl'
of fiduciary obligation.
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1n his brief, appellant states facts to support his
,i1ntention of breach of fiduciary duty which are not
. ·,tcnt with the evidence introduced at trial.
For
1
,.,,m"
t\ample, appellant states as a fact that the agents of
}lt. Olympus Realty failed to read Gerstner the entire
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase"
Brief of appellant P.38-39). However, the record
,hows otherwise; during a three-way conversation on
June 2, 1969, between Gerstner, Prothero, and Hyde,
the entire document was read to Gerstner verbatim (R.
JjO,lH-149). It was also made clear during the trial
that the reason the documents were not sent to Calilornia was because Gerstner had elected to come to Salt
Lake City "in a few days and close" (R.246). A review
,1f all documents had been contemplated at that time
1R.l50-151,246). Copies of the documents were in fact
furnished to Gerstner upon his arrival in Salt Lake
lily (R.248). The agents at Mt. Olympus Realty were
"ttempting to comply with Gerstner' s request to modify
the security arrangements of the transaction and still
preserve and bind Frandsen to his original offer to
p11rchase. l\It. Olympus, at all times, was acting for and
excluscirely in behalf of the best interests of their client.
POINT VII

\IT OLYMPUS REALTY, INC., HAD EX-

PRESS \\TRITTEN

AUTHORITY TO ACT
run DF,FENDANT AND BIND THE PLAINTlFF AND DEFENDANT IN CONTRACT.
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A. Mt. Olympus Realty, pursuant to the ·S·
Agency Contract" (Ex. P-1) , was given express
authority to act as exclusive agent for the def endar.
Gerstner. Pertinent language from that document reai

I hereby grant you for the period of six montl
from date hereof
exclusiYe Right to s1
lease or exchange said property or any part the·
of, at a price and terms stated hereon, or at Iii·
other price or terms to which I may agrer
writing. [Emphasis added.] (Ex. P-1)
The language is clear and unambiguous. )'.
Olympus had express authority to sell the proper
known as Millcreek Inn, if Gerstner so agreed in 111
mg.
The telegram of June 2, 1969,to John Hyde •I
P-7) represented such written agreement as was er·
templated by the language of the agency contra:
These written documents speak for themselves and 1n ·
Mt. Olympus was acting within the scope and prorn
of their agency contract (Ex. P-1) .
B. The trial court found, and there is abuna•:
evidence to show, that a contract was made betm-:
Alan Frandsen and the Gerstners on June 3. Jr
(R.463).

It is not disputed that the same day the defemL ·
Gene Gerstner telephoned his agent at l\It. Olyrn:
Realty, stating that he had changed his mind and
he requested a change in the terms of the agreeIDr
he accepted in his telegram of June 2, 1969 i R''
361), whereupon he asked Hyde to contact Frani·
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if he would accept a change in the security porlll'll of the sales agreement (R.146-147).
Although
]'rand sen agreed to modify this portion of the contract,
transaction was never completed. It is well known
nintract law that a contract provision cannot be modine<l without new consideration. See for example: 17
.Jm. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §465:

:,,

Cndoubtedly, a contract can be modified with
the assent of both parties provided . . . there is
consideration for the new agreement. ... A subordinate and separable part of the contract may
be . . . modified by the parties without cancellation or avoidance of the whole contract.
It is clear from the record that although Frandsen
was willing to modify the terms of the security portion
,if the contract, he and Gerstner never could come to
terms; therefore, an effective modification of the contract was never carried out. Consequently, the contract
11f June 3, 1969, remained unaltered and the proposed
:nodifi('ation requested by Gerstner on June 3, never
materialized. Therefore, any and all acts of Mt. Olympus Realty related to the contract of June 3, 1969, were
dearly within the proper scope of their agency relation1hip with the Gerstners, as contained in the formally
;iritten "Sales Agency Contract" (Ex. P-1).

POINT VIII
\JT. OLYMPCS REALTY IS ENTITLED TO
.\ DIRECTED VERDICT AWARDING A
RE.\L TOR'S CO.MMISSION.

29

Mt. Olympus' claim to a real estate comm·.
is contractual. The defendants Gerstner entered intr,
formal "Sales Agency Contract" with Mt. Olymp'.
Realty, Inc., (Ex. P-1) in which it was agreed:

During the life of this contract, if you tind
party who is
able and willing to bm ·
lease or exchange said property or any part ther;.
of, at said price_ and terms, or any other prit'.
or terms, to which I may agree in writing,,
if said property or any part thereof is sri, '
leased or exchanged I agree to pay a comrnisw
of 6% of such sale, lease or exchange.
I

There can be no question that on June 3, 1969. )!·
Olympus Realty had produced a party, Alan Fm:.
sen, who was ready, able and willing to
.
property, known as Millcreek Inn, on terms that we:· 1
acceptable to the defendant Gerstner as evidenced h
his telegram of June 2, 1969 (Ex. P-7). The rtai
Supreme Court, faced with a similar situation in Cur: 1
v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 P.2d 237 (mJ;
reasoned that:

,

A broker is entitled to commission when he k
produced a written binding offer or agreenit
signed by a ready, willing and able purcha·:
. . . Where a sale was never consummated r ·
cause the vendors changed their minds and. :
fused to sell and the purchasers were at W
uilling to bu11 and had the financial ab1l1t,11 _.
consu'mmate the sale the brokers fulfilled ilir
part of the listing ag;eement by having prodmt
purchasers who were ready, willing and
buy the property and were entitled to thm rr
missfon. [Emphasis added.]
1
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That Uerstner later had second thoughts on the Frand,en offer after acceptance had been communicated to
Frandsen, cannot in any way negate the fact that
()]l'Jnpus ha<l performed their part of the sales contract
,r:x. P-1). As amply supported above (Point III),
rhe wording of the sales contract itself, and by the Utah
Court in Curtis v. Mortensen, supra, Olympus'
right to a realtor's commission is not contingent upon
· the execution of closing documents or any other condition precedent but only on the contractual language
,, hich specifies:
Find[ing] a party who is ready, able and willing
to buy ... the property. (Ex. P-1)
It is not necessary that the transaction be completed
morder

for Mt. Olympus to be entitled to a realtor's
comm1ss10n.

CONCLUSION

The defendanfs contention that all controverted

tridence be construed in a light most favorable to them
!s subject to a reasonableness requirement. Even when
construing all evidence in a light most favorable to
defendants, they fail to raise a doubt sufficient to create
J r1uestion upon which reasonable minds could differ
'n
to proyide a question for the jury.
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A formal offer to purchase the premises knv·,
as Millcreek Inn was communicated by telephone fo
John Hyde of Olympus Realty to defendant Gt.
Gerstner on June 2, 1969. On the same evening Ger
ner sent a telegram to John Hyde of Olympus accer
ing the terms of the Frandsen offer exactly.
t
The following morning, June 3, 1969, John H1,J,
upon receiving the telegram, called the plaintiff .il.
Frandsen and informed him that his offer had
accepted, thus completing the contract.
Later the same day Gerstner called Hyde
asked him to attempt to get Frandsen to modify;:
security arrangements of the contract. Hyde, follow::.
Gertsner' s orders, contacted Frandsen and asked 1
the modification; Frandsen agreed. Gerstner,
arrival in Salt Lake, refused to accept the contract.
modified. Although the defendant contends that
never intended to accept the Frandsen off er by sendi:.
the telegram, the law imputes to a person an intent
corresponding to the reasonable meaning of his wor:
and acts.
The additional terms recited over the telephone·
John Hyde of Olympus by the defendant Gerstner
June 3, 1969, were merely attempts to modify the tx·
ing contract, and therefore Gerstner' s instructions·
his agent after the original terms were agreed upon;:
immaterial to any issue on this appeal.
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The documents in the contract dispute speak for
Jiemsclrcs anrl unequivocally show that there was absoJ11tc and unqualified agreement on all terms of the

Frandsen off er in the telegram of acceptance sent by
Gerstner; and the telegram represented a complete
3c:c:eptance of the offer and was not merely a part of
tlie negoliations. The defendants' contention that the
dosing documents had to be executed and the earnest
money receipt signed as a condition precedent to being
bound in contract is obviously without any merit whaterer.

It is also clear that either the "Offer to Purchase

.rnd Earnest Money Receipt" or the telegram, standing
by themselves, would be sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Utah's statute of frauds. Taken together, there

can be no question.

)It. Olympus Realty fulfilled its part of the "Sales
Contract" to the letter, and at all times acted
mording to the instructions and in the best interests
11
f their client, Gerstner, continuously observing sound
,'iii! efficient business practices and strictly adhering
'n the highest traditions of fiduciary trust.

ft cannot be questioned that Mt. Olympus had
t\press and written contractual authority to act for
defendants and bind the plaintiff and defendants in
crmtract for the sale of the Millcreek Inn and that
11
' Olympus Realty, because of its prompt, efficient
'1d faithful performance of its contractual obligations,
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is entitled to a directed verdict a warding a
commission.

realtijr
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